THE CONFLICT OF LAWS PROBLEM
BETWEEN THE LONGSHOREMEN'S
ACT AND STATE WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION ACTS
ARTHUR LARsON*

The Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act' is, in
form, an ordinary workmen's compensation act, modelled on the New
York act.2 There are perhaps hundreds of thousands of workers as to
whom, at some time or another, a question might arise whether they
fall under state compensation acts or under the Longshoremen's Act:
stevedores, repairmen, painters, construction workers, guards, and
dozens of other categories of workers, who live on shore but who work
on and off vessels or installations in navigable waters. The conflicts
question has proved to be a unique one. It was not approached like the
state-versus-state question, for here, instead of competition between
equal jurisdictions both subject to the full faith and credit provision,
the courts saw a preeminent federal maritime power on one side. But
neither could it be solved by a simple enforcement of this preeminent
federal power, as "seamen's" cases under the Jones Act s might be,
because the Longshoremen's Act is by its terms confined to an area
narrower than that of full maritime power in two respects: It applies
only to injuries that occur upon the navigable waters of the United
States, and it purports to be applicable only when state acts could not
validly apply. The first of these two terms, as the ensuing discussion
will show, has assumed a dominant and decisive position; the second
has by judicial decision become a dead letter.
In order to understand the present state of the law on this subject,
and predict its probable course in the future, one must trace the
development of the state-maritime division of jurisdiction from a point
some years before the Longshoremen's Act was passed. Six phases can be
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detected in the unfolding of this story, each representing a dramatic
change in state-maritime relations.
PHASE I: UNQUALIFIED FEDERAL
MARITIME PREEMINENCE
The Jensen4 case, in 1917, held that New York's workmen's compensation act could not constitutionally be applied to a stevedore injured on
board ship while engaged in unloading cargo at a New York pier. Both
the locus of the injury, being on navigable waters, and the nature of the
employment were maritime. It followed, said the Supreme Court, that
application of individual state acts to such injuries would prejudice the
uniformity of the maritime law. The doctrine that the maritime law's
uniformity must be preserved at all costs was itself brought to full
flower by this same decision, although earlier cases contained some
adumbration of it.5
So strong and uncompromising was the Supreme Court's devotion
to this principle of uniformity that it actually struck down two attempts
by Congress to undo the effect of the Jensen decision by express legislation preserving to claimants "the rights and remedies under the Workmen's Compensation Law of any state" in maritime situations.0
In this phase, then, the law was relatively dear-perhaps clearer
than it has ever been since, but the clarity was obtained at the price
of denying no-fault compensation of thousands of workers in very
hazardous "amphibious" occupations, since longshoremen, not being
"seamen," did not even have the traditional seamen's no-fault remedy
7
of maintainance and cure.
PHASE II: THE "MARITIME-BUT-LOCAL" TEST
Five years after the Jensen case, in 1922, the Rohde8 case applied to
workmen's compensation a doctrine worked out earlier in death statute
4. Southern Paciflo Co. v. Jensen, 244 US. 205 (1917).
5. See, e.g., The Lottawanna, 88 US. (21 Wall.) 558 (1874).
6. Act of October 6, 1917, ch. 97, 40 Stat. 395, in Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart,
253 US. 149 (1920).
The second attempt differed from the first in that it excepted masters and members
of crews. Act of June 10, 1922, ch. 216, 42 Stat. 634, in Washington v. W.C. Dawson & Co.,

264 US. 219 (1924).
7. At this time, the concept of "seaman" was limited to the typical mariner-one
who was trained to reef and maneuver a vessel. Beddoo v. Smoot Sand & Gravel Corp.,
128 F.2d 608 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
8. Grant Smith-Porter Ship Co. v. Rohde, 257 US. 469 (1922).
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cases: 9 The uniformity of maritime law is not prejudiced by the application of state statutes to maritime employment that is local in character. The work was deemed local if it had no direct relation to navigation or commerce. One of the best-established distinctions under this
test was that between construction work on an uncompleted vessel by a
carpenter, painter, plumber or other artisan, and maintenance or
repair work on a vessel already completed. The former was not deemed
to affect commerce, and fell within local acts; 10 the latter bore a direct
relation to the facilitation of commerce, and was therefore beyond the
reach of the states when the injury occurred over navigable waters.1 1
Loading and unloading ships was definely related to commerce, even
when the particular workman's participation in this function was intermittent or infrequent. 12 But such activities as the following were held
3
to be of local concern: removal of a submerged obstruction by a diver;'
building a pier from a floating raft;' 4 building a marina in a navigable
lake; 15 checking lumber on a barge;' 6 pushing a fishing boat into the
water;' 7 delivering a small boat;' 8 making up logging booms in navi9. See, e.g., Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U.S. 238 (1921).
10. Federal: John Bahley Iron Works v. Span, 281 U.S. 222 (1930); Messel v. Foundation Co., 274 US. 427 (1927); Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Dahl, 266 U.S. 449 (1925).
Michigan: La Casse v. Great Lakes Eng'r Works, 242 Mich. 454, 219 N.W. 780 (1928)
(contains thorough analysis of Supreme Court cases on point).
New York: Seeler v. Otis Elevator Co., 281 App. Div. 140, 120 N.Y.S.2d 825 (1952)
(elevator company employee, injured while installing elevator aboard ship one day after
commissioning but prior to final completion of construction, held within New York act).
Texas: Travelers Ins. Co. v. Gonzalez, 851 S.W.2d 374 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961) (claimant
was injured while working as a painter and sandblaster on a new and incomplete drilling
barge, docked on navigable waters. The court affirmed state compensation jurisdiction
with the comment that there was no other evidence, such as the nature of the contract
under which the barge work was being done, to indicate maritime service or employment).
11. Grant Smith-Porter Ship Co. v. Rohde, 257 U.S. 469 (1922).
12. Employers' Liab. Assur. Corp. v. Cook, 281 U.S. 28 (1980).
13. Miller's Indem. Underwriters v. Brand, 270 U.S. 59 (1926).
14. State Indus. Bd. v. Terry & Tench Co., 273 U.S. 689 (1926).
15. Garrisey v. Westshore Marina Associates, 2 Wash. App. 718, 469 P.2d 590 (1970)
(claimant injured while working on a marina being constructed in a navigable lake sought
and received compensation benefits, and then sought to recover damages against the employer for negligence and for unseaworthiness of the barge on which he was working.
Held, work being done was of local concern, so that plaintiff's election of compensation
benefits was binding).
16. Rosengrant v. Harvard, 278 U.S. 664 (1927).
17. Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 276 U.S. 467 (1928).
See also Cordova Fish & Cold Storage Co. v. Estes, 370 P.2d 180 (Alaska 1962) (a crab
fisherman was injured at the end of the day while moving some crab pots on the deck
of the boat, which was tied to the dock. The pots, the boat, a helper, and the bait were
supplied by the cannery, although at times the fisherman dug his own bait when the
supply was not available. The court held that his duties were sufficiently adjacent to the
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gable water; 19 working as a sweeper on a garbage scow; 20 and the servicing of a refrigerator in a ship's galley by a local refrigerator
2
company 1
All this, while it constricted the area within the ban of the Jensen
case, still left all stevedores and a large proportion of the other amphibious workers outside the range of any no-fault compensation protection.
PHASE III: THE LONGSHOREMEN'S ACT
In 1927, the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act
was passed with the object of covering those waterfront workers whom
the best efforts of Congress and the state courts had failed to bring within
state protection. Its limits of applicability were defined in terms
related to maritime power, on the one hand, and state power, on the
other, as worked out by case law in Phases I and II. That is, the Longshoremen's Act did not, in any event, extend to an injury unless it
occurred upon navigable waters of the United States; and, even if this
condition was satisfied, it applied only "if recovery for the disability
or death through workmen's compensation proceedings may not validly
be provided by state law."22
As to the requirement of occurrence of injury on navigable waters,
this meant that the general maritime character of claimant's employment was ineffective to bring him under the act if the injury occurred
on land; and it was of no consequence that the great bulk of his work
was on the water, or that his landward excursions were brief, temporary
and intermittent. 23 Of course, since the sea is so close to the land,
hair-splitting decisions were occasionally necessary in assigning the
25
locus of injury to the one or the other. The Taylor24 and Minnie
cases provide the classical illustration of this process. In Taylor, the
business of the cannery to apply the twilight-zone theory on a maritime-but-local concept,

since the crab pots were placed in "inland waters" less than a mile from shore. State
compensation award affirmed).
18. Szumski v. Dale Boat Yards, Inc., 48 N.J. 401, 226 A.2d 11 (1967) (decedent suf-

fered a fatal heart attack while at sea in a small boat he was delivering, although 90%
of his time was spent on land. Held, New Jersey had jurisdiction to apply its compensation
act).
19. Sultan Ry.&Timber Co. v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 277 U.S, 185 (1928).
20. In re Herbert's Case, 283 Mass. 348, 186 N.E. 554 (1933).
21. Hammond v. Albany Garage Co., 267 App. Div. 647, 47 N.Y.S.2d 897 (1944).
22. 33 U.S.C. § 903 (1970).
23. Northern Coal & Dock Co. v. Strand, 278 U.S. 142 (1928).
24. T. Smith & Son Inc. v. Taylor, 276 U.S. 179 (1928). See the fuller discussion of
this type of question, including more recent cases, at text accompanying notes 59-60 infra.
25. Minnie v. Port Huron Terminal Co., 295 U.S. 647 (1935).
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injury occurred when a longshoreman, standing on a dock, was
knocked into navigable water by a crane operated from a vessel. Compensation under a state act was upheld because the impact occurred
upon the land, and it was the impact that caused the injury and gave
rise to the workman's rights. In Minnie, the positions were exactly
reversed: The workman was on the deck of a vessel when a crane,
operated from the land, struck him and knocked him onto the land.
Again the place where the initial blow fell was held to control, and
the state compensation act was held inapplicable.
As to the second condition of applicability-the absence of state
power to cover the injury-the decisions for the first 15 years under the
Longshoremen's Act followed the standards laid down during Phase II,
amassing an elaborate body of law classifying endless combinations
and permutations of land and maritime employment foctors. 26 Toward
the end of Phase III there was a case typical of those which kept the
27
courts busy and the litigants uncertain, Parker v. Motor Boat Sales.
A small store selling boats and maritime equipment had a janitor and
handyman whose work was almost entirely on land. On this occasion,
however, he was sent to help carry an outboard motor to the river to
be tested. Without authorization he went along on the test run and
was drowned when the boat capsized. The deputy commissioner awarded
compensation under the Longshoremen's Act; the district court
affirmed; the circuit court of appeals reversed; 28 and the Supreme
Court restored the original award. The Court stressed that the maritime character of decedent's employment was not to be determined by
the habitual performance of duties on land, but by the character of the
activity in which he was engaged at the moment of injury.
This decision by the highest court appeared to scrap the "local"
exception to maritime employment, for the relation to navigation and
commerce of a casual and unauthorized ride in a tiny outboard motor
boat might seem to approach the vanishing-point. It was not until the
following year that the Supreme Court revealed what this case was leading up to.
PHASE IV: "TWILIGHT ZONE" RULE
In 1942, the Supreme Court in the Davis case 29 adopted what came to
be known as the "twilight zone" rule. The case involved a structural
26. See notes 10-21 supra.
27. Parker v. Motor Boal Sales, Inc., 314 U.S. 244 (1941).

28. Motor Boat Sales, Inc. v. Parker, 116 F.2d 789 (4th Cir. 1941).
29. Davis v. Dep't of Labor &Indus., 317 U.S. 249 (1942).
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steel worker who was engaged in dismantling a bridge across a navigable river. At the time of his death, he was working in a barge upon
which the dismantled steel had been placed. He was cutting some
of the steel into smaller pieces, after which it was to be carried a few
hundred feet down the river for storage. While so occupied, he fell
into the river and was drowned. Compensation under the state act was
denied by the supervisor, the state department of labor and industries,
the state superior court and the state supreme court.8 0 However, on
certiorari the United States Supreme Court reversed and held that
the state act could be applied.
The revolutionary feature of the decision was that no attempt
was made to reach this result by an extension of the existing "local
concern" doctrine or by any other adaptation of principles worked
out during Phases I, II and III. Two new grounds stood out in the
opinion, one legal, the other utilitarian. The legal ground was that,
when a compensation case falling within the "twilight zone" of uncertainty comes before a tribunal-whether a state workmen's compensation commission or a federal deputy commissioner applying the
Longshoremen's Act-there is a presumption of coverage which should
prevail in the absence of a convincing reason rebutting it. The Longshoremen's Act contains an express presumption of jurisdiction, while
the states have the benefit of the overall presumption of the constitutionality of the application of their statutes. Therefore, given a borderline case, and given a presumption of coverage, it followed that all
borderline cases were to be resolved in favor of coverage by the first
act under which application was made by the claimant.
The utilitarian ground was that the court evidently felt it time
to call a halt to the time-consuming and expensive process of fighting
each close case through the appellate hierarchy; it therefore removed
the incentive by ruling out reversals if jurisdiction was assumed anywhere within the doubtful area. The effectiveness of this move to
reduce litigation was, however, subject to question, for, while it removed the necessity for pencilling a fine line between state and longshoremen's acts, it left the eventual task of drawing two lines-one on
each side of the shaded area of the twilight zone. It was generally
assumed that these two lines bounding the twilight zone could at least
be traced by connecting the dots made by individual Supreme Court
decisions on familiar categories of employment, and that the new doctrine would apply only when fact combinations appeared that did
20. 12 Wash. 2d 849, 121 P.2d 565 (1942).
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not arrange themselves clearly on one side or the other of the twilight
zone as marked out by these numerous and well-established precedents.
If they did so fall outside the twilight zone, it was apparently also
assumed that, if they fell clearly on the traditional federal side, federal
coverage would be exclusive because of the preeminence of maritime
power, and, similarly, if they fell clearly on the state side under the
maritime-but-local cases, state jurisdiction would be exclusive because
of the express provision in the Longshoremen's Act abdicating jurisdiction when state acts could validly apply.
But once more the Supreme Court had a surprise in store for the
profession.
PHASE V: CONCURRENT JURISDICTION
The first sign of a possible break in this pattern involved the federal
side. Of all the categories of borderline employment, the one which
had been most authoritatively, repeatedly and decisively placed on
the federal side was repair work on a previously-completed vessel, as
distinguished from construction work on an uncompleted vessel. 31
Such an employment was involved in Moores's Case,3 2 in which the
workman was injured while helping to move repair materials on board
a vessel under repair in a dry dock. The Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts, confronted with not only three United States Supreme
Court cases but also one of its own 33 which classified this employment
as federal, interpreted the Davis case as virtually effacing all the old
landmarks. Its construction of the case is embodied in the following
remarkable paragraph:
[A]lthough apparently some heed must still be paid to the line
between State and Federal authority as laid down in the cases
following the Jensen case, the most important question has now
become the fixing of the boundaries of the new 'twilight zone,' and
for this the case gives us no rule or test other than the indefinable
and subjective test of doubt ....
Probably therefore our proper
course is not to attempt to reason the matter through and to reconcile previous authorities, or to preserve fine lines of distinction,
but rather simply to recognize the futility of attempting to reason
logically about 'illogic,' and to regard the Davis case as intended to
be a revolutionary decision deemed necessary to escape an intoler31.
32.

See notes 10-11 supra.
323 Mass. 162, 80 N.E.2d 478, aff'd sub nom. Bethlehem Steel Co. v. Moores, 335

US. 874 (1948).
33. O'Hara's Case, 248 Mass. 31, 142 N.E. 844 (1924).
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able situation and as designed to include within a wide circle of
doubt all water front cases involving aspects pertaining both to the
land and to the sea where a reasonable argument can be made
either way, even though a careful examination of numerous previous decisions might disclose an apparent weight of authority one
way or the other.34

If this was not what the Supreme Court meant, it had an opportunity to say so, for the case was taken there on certiorari. But the
Massachusetts decision was affirmed in a per curiam memorandum
decision. 35
At this point it might have been possible to conjecture that the
Supreme Court did not intend the implications inherent in its
memorandum opinion. But this conjecture became less supportable
when, in the Baskin8" case, the rule in Moores was in effect carried a
step further. Baskin was a shipyard worker who worked mostly on
shore. He was injured on board a vessel while assisting in its repair
by moving planks from one hold to another. The California commission and courts denied compensation.87 The Supreme Court of the
United States reversed, again in a memorandum opinion, suggesting
merely that the California courts take a look at the Moores case. The
Baskin case is, if anything, more striking than the Moores case, since
in Moores the Court merely declined to upset an award granted by the
state court, while in Baskin it in effect told the state court to make
an award which had been denied. An award was duly made to Baskin,
and the case once more found its way to the United States Supreme
Court, this time on the theory that the employee had elected to come
under the Longshoremen's Act by accepting some payments made
thereunder, although without an award. This defense was rejected by
the Court in another per curiam memorandum opinion, 88 citing the
previous Baskin case, the Moores case and the Davis case.
At this point, for both chronological and analytical reasons, the
still-cloudy and controversial story of possible concurrent state jurisdiction in traditionally federal areas will be interrupted to permit
introduction of the next89 major Supreme Court decision, the Calbeck
34. 323 Mass. 162, 167, 80 N.E2d 478, 480 (1948).
35. Bethlehem Steel Co. v. Moores, 335 U.S. 874 (1948).
36. Baskin v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 338 U.S. 854 (1949).
37. Baskin v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 89 Cal. App. 2d 632, 201 P.2d 549 (1949).
38. Kaiser Co. v. Baskin, 340 U.S. 886 (1950).
39. Between Baskin and Calbeck there was another per curiam Supreme Court opinion
which, although it contained some theoretical implications on the twilight-zone doctrine
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case,40 which, while controversial, is clear in its assertion of full concurrent federal jurisdiction in traditionally state areas of maritime
injury. Two welders were injured while working on the construction
of new vessels floating on navigable waters. One welder at times had
worked on the repair of completed vessels; the other welder had only
worked on new vessels. Thus, just as Moores and Baskin had involved
one of the best-established categories of federal jurisdiction, repair of
completed vessels, so Calbeck involved one of the best-established categories of maritime-but-local state jurisdiction, construction of new
vessels. 4 ' Nevertheless, the Supreme Court concluded "that Congress
invoked its constitutional power so as to provide compensation for all
injuries sustained by employees on navigable waters, whether or not a
particular injury might also have been within the constitutional reach
of a state workmen's compensation law." To put the matter in blunt
terms, the Court by judicial construction deleted from the Longshoremen's Act the second condition of coverage, "and if recovery . . .
through workmen's compensation proceedings may not validly be
42
provided by State law," as the dissent quite accurately pointed out.
Since the direct holding of the case is so definite and well-settled,
there is little reason to rehearse or debate in detail the merits of the
Court's rationale-as it bears on the specific issue decided. But the
opinion will repay some scrutiny as possibly throwing light on the stillunsettled issue: Do the states similarly now have concurrent jurisdiction
in traditionally federal categories of maritime employment, notably
that evoked contemporary comment, had limited direct applicability. The case was Hahn
v. Ross Island Sand & Gravel Co., 358 U.S. 272 (1959), holding that, when a case fell within
the twilight zone, the fact that the employer was covered by the Longshoremen's Act did

not prevent a common-law suit against him as a non-electing employer under the state
act. The point is discussed in the text accompanying notes 119-120 infra.

40. Calbeck v. Travelers Ins. Co., 370 U.S. 114 (1962).
41. See text accompanying note 11 supra.
42. Justices Stewart and Harlan, dissenting, argued:
I think the statute still means what it says, and what it has always been thought
to mean-namely, that there can be no recovery under the [Longshoremen's] Act
in cases where the State may constitutionally confer a workmen's compensation
remedy. While the result reached today may be a desirable one, it is simply not
what the lav provides ....
In order to avoid the harsh results.. . [of this "jurisdictional dilemma'] the
Court in Davis v. Department of Labor, 317 U.S. 249, developed the theory of the
twilight zone ....It was noted that both the Federal Act and the state compensation statute "show dearly that neither was intended to encroach on the field
occupied by the other."

...

Whatever else may be said of the Davis decision, it thus dearly rested on a
construction of the statute precisely opposite to that adopted by the Court today.
Indeed, if today's decision is correct, then there was no reason for the "twilight
zone" doctrine worked out with such travail in Davis. For the Court now holds
that the problem which led to the Davis decision never really existed.
370 U.S. at 132, 186, 137.
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ship repair and stevedoring? Leaving aside the Court's review of legislative history and of earlier cases, one can boil its rationale down to
two practical considerations: The decision was necessary both to eliminate possible gaps in compensation protection of maritime workers and
to eliminate intolerable uncertainty, delay, litigation, burdensomeness,
and changeability in the process of deciding jurisdiction on a case-bycase basis. This two-part justification of the result is seen in the
following passage, following the Court's review of the act's legislative
history:
In sum, it appears that the Longshoremen's Act was designed
to ensure that a compensation remedy existed for all injuries
sustained by employees on navigable waters, and to avoid uncertainty as to the source, state or federal, of that remedy.43
As to the first ground, the possibility of lacunae in coverage resulted from the curious choice by the drafters of the Longshoremen's
Act of the word "may" in the clause limiting the act's reach. One need
only postulate a set of facts in which, under established maritime-butlocal decisions, a state "may" constitutionally provide compensation
coverage, but simply has not done so. We now confront a situation in
which certain workers, who are clearly within federal constitutional
maritime power if Congress chose to exercise it, are in danger of being
left altogether unprotected by either state or federal workmen's compensation. Congress, the Court concluded, could not in the light of the
legislative history have intended such a result. Therefore an interpretation must be adopted that would avoid it.
One such possible interpretation, considered and rejected, was
that when Congress said "may be" it really meant "is." This, however,
involved not just one difficulty but two. The first was that it necessitated
changing the plain language of the statute, since "may be" does
not mean "is," and consequently the Court, in principle, would
have been just as guilty of tampering with Congressional language as
it was when it in effect read the whole clause out. But even if the
Court had construed the act to mean that federal jurisdiction was
defeated only when compensation protection was in fact provided
by the particular state law, it faced the second difficulty that:
[Sjuch a reading would make federal coverage in the 'local concern' area depend on whether or not a state legislature had taken
certain action-an intention plainly not to be imputed to a
43. Id. at 124.
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Congress whose recent efforts to leave the matter entirely to the
States had twice been struck down as unconstitutional delegations
of congressional power. 44
The second ground of the Calbeck decision, that of avoiding
uncertainty and litigation, places Calbeck in the direct line of succession of the twilight zone cases, since it was this same ground that
led to the twilight zone rule in Davis. The Court begins by stressing
the element of vagueness: "[T]he contours of the 'local concern' concept were and have remained necessarily vague and uncertain." 45
It adds the factor of litigiousness: "There never has been any method
of staking them out except litigation in particular cases." 46 Then
changeability: "Such a purpose would require, rather, that federal
coverage expand and recede in harness with developments in constitutional interpretation as to the scope of state power to compensate injuries on navigable waters." 47 And finally administrative burdensomeness:

But that would mean that every litigation raising an issue of
federal coverage would raise an issue of constitutional dimension,
with all that that implies; and that each and every award of federal
compensation would be a constitutionally premised denial of state
competence in a like situation. We cannot conclude that Congress
imposed such a burden on the administration of compensation by
thus perpetuating the confusion generated by Jensen.48
The Court then reviews its previous decisions, notably Parker
and Davis, and points out that "they are entirely consistent with our
conclusion."4 9
PHASE VI: NAVIGABLE WATERS TEST
AS DOMINANT
If Calbeck seemed to be a bold move in the direction of enlarged
federal coverage, there was to appear a case seven years later that with
equal forthrightness restricted the limits of the Longshoremen's Act in
relation to state jurisdiction. That case was Nacirema Operating Co.
44. Id. at 125.

45. Id. at 124.
46. Id. at 125.
47. Id. at 126.
48. Id.
49. The final issue, stemming from the prior acceptance of state benefits by one
daimant, is dealt with in the text accompanying notes 108-10 infra.
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v. Johnson.50 It held that the Longshoremen's Act never applies unless
the injury occurred upon navigable waters.
It is a little difficult to understand why this decision should have
caused any particular surprise, considering the unambiguous language
of the statute.5 ' Probably the reason was that the "twilight zone" habit
of thought had become imperceptibly transferred to the navigable
waters requirement. Actually, the entire twilight zone development,
from Parker through Davis to Calbeck, was concerned, not with the
navigable waters boundary line, but with the absence-of-state-power
boundary line. In all the twilight-zone cases, the fact of occurrence of
the injury on navigable waters was not in dispute. There was nothing
in the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court that could be cited as a
holding or even a dictum that the act applied beyond navigable waters.
The best that the dissenting justices could come up with was a rather
loose fragment of a sentence buried in a quotation from a Fifth Circuit
case used by the Court in Calbeck, 52 and a statement by a federal district
judge picked up by Judge Sobeloff in the decision below.5 8 Three other
50. 396 US. 212 (1969). Justices Douglas, Black and Brennan dissented.
51. "Compensation shall be payable ... only if the disability or death results from
an injury occurring upon the navigable waters of the United States (including any dry
dock) ..
33
8.."
US.C. § 908(a) (1970).
52. The dissent stated that "we" (i.e., the Supreme Court) had said in Calbeck, 870
US. at 180: ".... 'Congress intended the compensation act to have a coverage co-extensive
with the limits of its authority .... .' This, however, is followed by ". . . quoting from
De Bardeleben Coal Corp. v. Henderson, 142 F.2d 481, 483." (Emphasis added). In other
words, the Supreme Court was not itself the author of the quotation-the Circuit Court
was. Moreover, if the entire quoted sentence is read, which the dissent chops off without
indicating that the sentence quoted was not complete, it is dear that the statement is
addressed only to the issue of federal power in relation to the second limitation, "if recovery ... may not validly be provided by state law." 370 US. at 130. At both the beginning and end of the complete quotation the phrase "on navigable waters" appears (see
370 US. at 129, 131), indicating that there was never any consideration of the possible
issue of extending federal coverage beyond this point. Throughout the Calbeck opinion,
the Court repeatedly and scrupulously limits its statements to injuries upon navigable
waters. The phrase occurs on almost every page of the opinion; see, e.g., 370 U.S. at 115,
116, 117, 119, 120, 124, 125, 126, 129 and 181. It is invariably included at those points
where the Court sums up its exact holding; e.g.: "We conclude that Congress used the
phrase 'if recovery ... may not validly be provided by State law' in a sense consistent with
the delineation of coverage as reaching injuries occurring on navigable waters." 870 US.
at 126.
58. The passage from Judge Sobeloff's opinion most on point is this:
Again, in the words of Judge Palmieri [in Michigan Mutual Liab. Co. v. Arrien,
233 F. Supp. 496, 500, aff'd 44 F.2d 640], it thus appears that "upon navigable
waters" is to be equated with "admiralty jurisdiction."
898 F.2d at 905.
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circuits were cited by the Supreme Court as having held contra the
Fourth Circuit's holding here under review.54
The principal argument of the respondents was that the act should
be so construed that coverage follows not the situs of the injury but the
status of the longshoreman as a person engaged in performing a maritime contract. But, as the Court points out, the distinction between
locality of injury and locality of contract as a determinant of jurisdiction is a familiar one. In the early history of workmen's compensation
acts, much of the story concerns the choice between tort or contract
theories as the basis for jurisdiction. 5r If Congress had intended to
adopt the contract approach, there would have been no mystery about
how to do it, since many states had already done so, and since for
other purposes the concept of admiralty contract jurisdiction, extending
over all contracts relating "to the navigation, business or commerce of
the sea" wherever made or executed, was well known." But the language chosen is unambiguously that of place of injury, and, if there
were any doubt, the legislative history traced by the Court fully confirms this conclusion.
The Court readily concedes that there is much t-6 be said for a
uniform treatment of longshoremen injured while loading or unloading a ship. There has always been something incongruous about
the picture of a stevedore walking in and out of a federal and state act
dozens of times a day whenever he crosses a gangplank. But to change
this is a matter for Congress, which originally made this choice for
reasons that admittedly are not as cogent today as they were in 1927;
that is, the locality approach was more suited to the original objective
of filling the gaps left by state coverage than would have been the
contract approach, whose objective would necessarily have been a
sweeping takeover of entire categories of employment. The Court
goes on to show, however, that extending the outer boundaries of the
act to the periphery of maritime jurisdiction rather than of navigable
54. See 396 U.S. at 214 n.4:
Nicholson v. Calbeck, 385 F.2d 221 (CA. 5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 US. 1051
(1968); Houer v. O'Leary, 383 F.2d 730 (CA. 9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S.
954 (1968); Travelers Insurance Co. v. Shea, 382 F.2d 344 (CA. 5th Cir. 1967), cert.
denied sub noma. McCullough v. Travelers Insurance Co., 389 U.S. 1050 (1968);
Michigan Mutual Liability Co. v. Arrien, 344 F.2d 640 (CA. 2d Cir.), cert. denied,

382 U.S. 835 (1965).
55. See A. L.4SoN,

THE LAw oF WomrK
's CoMPEmTiON §§ 87.20, 87.30 (1952).
56. De Lovio v. Bolt, 7 F. Cas. 418, 444 (No. 3776) (C.C.D. Mass. 1815) (Story, J.).
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waters would by no means automatically ensure uniformity and certainty:
And construing the Longshoremen's Act to coincide with the
limits of admiralty jurisdiction-whatever they may be and however they may change-simply replaces one line with another
whose uncertain contours can only perpetuate on the landward
side of the Jensen line, the same confusion which previously
57
existed on the seaward side.
It only remained for the Court to dispose of the argument that
the scope of the act was broadened by the Extension of Admiralty Jurisdiction Act 58-a not very arduous task. There are half-a-dozen obvious
reasons why this 1948 legislation, in connection with which the Longshoremen's Act was never mentioned, has no relevance to the matter
in hand, several of which the Court patiently enumerates. The most
self-evident is that the Extension Act is plainly, both by its wording
and its legislative history, aimed at the specific problem of extending
maritime jurisdiction to allow suits in rem or in personam for damage
to person or property in cases of ship-caused injury on a pier or on
land.
MEANING OF "INJURIES UPON NAVIGABLE WATERS"
Up to this point, the story of the Supreme Court's development of the
doctrines controlling longshoremen's conflicts has been told in mainly
chronological order, without lingering too long at various points to
examine the controversies that may have been left along the way. The
reason for this method of exposition is that these unresolved issues can
be intelligently discussed only against the full backdrop of Supreme
Court jurisprudence touching all aspects of the relation of the Longshoremen's Act to state acts. It is unquestionably true that the Calbeck
and Johnson cases swept large areas clean of uncertainty by providing
two straightforward doctrines: first, that the Longshoremen's Act
always covers all injuries occurring upon navigable waters, and second,
that it never covers injuries not occurring upon navigable waters.
Obviously this pair of rules now throws a heavy burden upon the concept of "occurring upon navigable waters," and accordingly the contro57. 596 U.S. at 223.
58. 46 U.S.C. § 740 (1970). The pertinent passage is:

The admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States shall extend to and
include all cases of damage or injury, to person or property, caused by a vessel on
navigable water, notwithstanding that such damage or injury be done or consummated on land.
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versies surrounding the application of that test will be examined first.
It must next be noted that, although the Calbeck-Johnson axis is in
principle sharp and clear as to what the Longshoremen's Act does and
does not cover, there is as yet no corresponding sharp and clear decision
on what, as a result of all these developments, the state acts do or do not
cover on the seaward side of the Jensen line. That question, which must
necessarily ask to what extent there is a twilight zone affecting, or concurrent state jurisdiction over, maritime injuries, will be treated next.
Then, to the extent that some concurrent jurisdiction may exist, there
follows the problem of possible successive and supplementary awards
whether in the form of state awards followed by federal or federal
awards followed by state.
The most common problem requiring a determination of the
exact place of injury is that in which the original impact or act causing
injury, and the place where the injury or death is consummated, are
divided between navigable waters and shore. A pair of typical early
cases, Taylor and Minnie,59 have already been mentioned, in the first
of which a man standing on a dock was knocked into the water, and in
the second of which a man standing on a ship was knocked onto land.
These two cases, both decided by the Supreme Court, held that the
point of initial impact controlled, as the act which caused the injury
and created the longshoreman's rights.
The present rule, however, appears to be one aimed not so much
at attaining conceptual symmetry as one designed to ensure maximum
preservation of the rights of the worker and his family. Thus, if the
issue is that of affirmative rights under the Longshoremen's Act, compensation would undoubtedly now be upheld if either the place of
impact or the place of culmination was on navigable waters. The
Minnie case 60 would cover the former. The latter is the fact situation
in Marine Stevedoring Corp. v. Oosting,61 in which compensation under
59. See notes 21-22 supra.
60. Minnie v. Port Huron Terminal Co., 295 U.S. 647 (1935). See also Mach v. Pennsylvania R.R., 198 F. Supp. 469 (W.D. Pa. 1958). Cf. Tarabocchia v. John W. McGrath
Corp., 270 F. Supp. 605 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (claimant's injury sustained in a fall from a removable skid on a pier to the apron below held not to occur on navigable waters).
61. 238 F. Supp. 78 (E.). Va. 1965), aff'd, 898 F.2d 900 (4th Cir. 1968).
See also The Interlake S.S. Co. v. Nielsen, 38 F.2d 879 (6th Cir. 1964), cert. denied,
381 US. 984 (1965), and O'Keeffe v. Atlantic Stevedoring Co., 354 F.2d 48 (5th Cir. 1965)
(longshoreman was caught up from the dock by a ship-based cargo loading rig and hoisted
into the air by one leg. He fell and suffered a fractured temporal bone, but death was
caused by drowning in the "slip." The court held that the accident had occurred on navi-

gable waters and therefore the widow's remedy would be a Longshoremen's Act award).
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the Longshoremen's Act was awarded by the federal district court and
affirmed by the Fourth Circuit in the case of a longshoreman who was
drowned after being knocked off a pier. It is significant that this case,
although grouped with the cases in the Fourth Circuit that went to
the Supreme Court under the name of Nacirema Operating Co. v.
Johnson, and indeed although it gave its name to the decision below,
was not itself taken to the Supreme Court.
When the issue stems from the assumption of jurisdiction by a
state, in view of the tone of Supreme Court cases since Davis, it is
difficult to believe that a state would be denied the right to award compensation if either the initial impact 62 or the culmination were on land.
Similarly, if the effect of a finding of injury on navigable waters is to
defeat an action for damages rather than to confer affirmative benefits,
the question may be resolved in favor of the plaintiff in the type of case
in which the impact is on land and the longshoreman is plunged into
navigable waters.68
One of the alternative grounds relied upon by Judge Sobeloff in
the Johnson group of cases6" was that the piers on which the accidents
occurred were quite large, so that small vessels and barges could pass,
beneath them; accordingly, he reasoned that these cases could be analogized to instances in which compensation had been awarded for injuries resulting from plane accidents above navigable waters.65 The
Supreme Court firmly rejected this idea saying: "Piers, like bridges,
are not transformed from land structures into floating structures by the
mere fact that vessels may pass beneath them." 0
62. When the original impact was on land, T. Smith & Son Inc. v. Taylor, 276 U.S.
179 (1928), presumably still stands, upholding the claim under state law.
63. Stott v. Thompson, 294 II1. App. 450, 14 N.E2d 246, cert. denied, 205 U.S. 639
(1938). See also Murphy v. Boston & Maine R.R., 319 Mass. 413, 65 N.E.2d 923 (1946);
cf. Baldwin v. Linde-Griffith Constr. Co., 115 N.J.L. 608, 181 A. 35 (Ct. Err. & App. 1935).

See discussion of the general question of the relation between compensation coverage and
availability of common law actions at text accompanying notes 119-20 infra.
64.

Marine Stevedoring Corp. v. Oosting, 398 F.2d 900 (4th Cir. 1968).

65. Judge Sobeloff cited D'Aleman v. Pan American World Airways, 259 F.2d 493
(2d Cir. 1958), which held that the phrase "on the high seas" in the Death on the High
Seas Act, U.S.C. §§ 761-67 (1970), included a cause of action arising in a plane flying
above the ocean.
See also Nalco Chemical Corp. v. Shea, 419 F.2d 572 (5th Cir. 1969) (decedent, a pilotsalesman, spent most of his time traveling to offshore oil platforms by float plane or boat
and often spent as long as a week at a time at the employer's offshore installations. He
was killed while delivering chemicals to a platform by plane. Employer was held to be
subject to the Longshoremen's Act because decedent's work came under this classification).
66. 396 U.S. at 215 n.6. The Court cites its own decision in Rodrigue v. Aetna Cas. &
Sur. Co., 395 U.S. 352, 360, 366 (1969). The Fifth Circuit had rejected a similar contention
several years earlier in Nicholson v. Calbeck, 385 F.2d 221 (5th Cir. 1967) (that a small
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The analogy is somewhat far-fetched, in view of the fact that, in
the case of the pier, one begins with a structure connected permanently
to the land and festooned with a long and venerable line of Supreme
Court cases holding that they are extensions of the land, while in the
airplane cases one begins with no connection except thin air. Piers,
docks, wharves and all similar structures permanently attached to the
land have always been treated as part of the land, 67 as distinguished
from gangplanks,68 skids,69 and comparable structures" that provide
only temporary connection between land and vessels. The pier need
not be directly connected to land; it has been held sufficient if a permanent pier was attached to the outboard edge of a warehouse which
itself was partially on land.71
Although the constitutional maritime power of the United States
includes not only the navigable waters of the United States but also
the high seas as well, it seems clear from the choice of statutory language that Congress intended to confine the Longshoremen's Act to the
territorial navigable waters of the United States. This intent is suggested by the fact that, when Congress wanted to cover injuries sustained in oil drilling operations beyond territorial waters, it felt it
necessary to pass a separate act, the Outer Continental Shelf Lands
Act,72 applying the provisions of the Longshoremen's Act to such injuries.
craft no larger than a canoe could navigate under the pier was held not to make the

location of the injury "upon navigable waters"--denial of compensation affirmed).
67. Swanson v. Marra Bros., 328 U.S. 1 (1946); Minnie v. Port Huron Terminal Co.,

295 U.S. 647 (1935); T. Smith & Son Inc. v. Taylor, 276 U.S. 179 (1928); State Indus. Comm'n
v. Nordenholt Corp., 259 U.S. 263 (1922); Cleveland Terminal & Valley R.R. v. Cleveland

S.S. Co., 208 U.S. 316 (1908); The Plymouth, 70 U.S. (3Wall.) 20 (1866); Houser v. O'Leary,
383 F.2d 780 (9th Cir. 1967); Johnston v. Marshall, 128 F.2d 13 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 817
U.S. 629 (1942); Stansbury v. Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores, Inc., 159 So. 2d 728 (La. App.

1964).
68. The Admiral Peoples, 295 U.S. 649 (1935); Beasley v. O'Hearne, -0 F. Supp. 49
(S.D.W. Va. 1966) (decedent worked at a coal crusher and tipple on the banks of the Ohio
River. The coal was loaded on barges moored to pilings off-shore, and access to the barges
was by way of a ladder. While working, decedent fell off a barge, ladder or a catwalk
connecting the piling with the shore and drowned. The court held that such work involved maritime employment, and that the death occurred on navigable waters, regardless
of which of the above alternatives was actually true); West v. Erie R.R., 163 F. Supp. 879
(S.D.N.Y. 1958); Caldaro v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 166 F. Supp. 883 (E.D.N.Y. 1956).
69. Michigan Mut. Liab. Co. v. Arrien, 344 F.2d 640 (2d Cir. 1965) (claimant was
injured while working on a temporary skid between the ship and the wharf-held that
the accident occurred upon navigable waters and was within the Longshoremen's Act).
70. Byrd v. New York Cent. Sys., 6 N.J. Super. 568, 70 A.2d 97 (Hudson County Ct.,
L. Div. 1949).
71. Nicholson v. Calbeck, 385 F.2d 221 (5th Cir. 1967), discussed in note 66 supra.
72. 43 U.S.C. § 133(c) (1970). The relevant portion of the Act is as follows:
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The general body of cases defining and identifying "navigable
waters" is, of course, directly usable to determine Longshoremen's Act
jurisdiction. In spite of the wealth of precedent, an occasional question
can still arise about whether particular waters are navigable. For ex3 during the construction
ample, in Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. O'Leary,"
of a dam across a navigable river, four construction workers had been
drowned while attempting to close off the temporary diversion tunnel.
The court rejected the employer's contention that, since only onetwentieth of the river stream was passing through the tunnel, the
workers were not on navigable waters within the Longshoremen's and
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act.
The full wording of the navigable-waters section of the Longshoremen's Act is: "....

upon the navigable waters of the United States (in-

cluding any dry dock)."r 4 The inclusion of the word "dry dock" as
designating a specific area of coverage presents the courts with a straight
question of definition of a statutory term, free of any of the usual
overtones of policy, philosophy, or constitutional principle. There are,
according to the Bureau of Yards and Docks of the Navy Department,
three principal types of facilities used for dry docking. 7 The first,
With respect to disability or death of an employee resulting from any injury
occurring as the result of operations described in subsection (b) of this section,
compensation shall be payable under the provisions of the Longshoremen's and
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act. For the purposes of the extension of the provisions of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Act under this section(1) the term "employee" does not include a master or member of a crew of any
vessel, or an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof or of
any State or foreign government, or of any political subdivision thereof;
(2) the term "employer" means an employer any of whose employees are employed
in such operations; and
(3) the term "United States" when used in a geographical sense includes the outer
Continental Shelf and artificial islands and fixed structures thereon.
It has been held that, under this language, there is no room for twilight zone between
state acts and the Shelf Lands Act: Crooks v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 175 So. 2d 875
(La. App. 1965) (under 43 U.S.C.A. § 1333, subsections (b) and (c), an employee injured
while employed in drilling operations 30 miles off shore can recover only under the Longshoremen's Act); Goodart v. Maryland Cas. Co., 139 So. 2d 567 (La. App. 1962) (a general
mechanic was injured while being transported from a crewboat to the platform of an oil
rig situated in the Gulf of Mexico. The court held that extension of the Longshoremen's
Act under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act established exclusive jurisdiction under
the federal act and preempted an award under the Louisiana act. The locale of the injury
controlled even though the land-based mechanic was not employed as the typical maritime
worker, longshoreman, or harborworker); Touchet v. Travelers Indem. Co., 221 F. Supp.
376 (W.D. La. 1963) (oil field worker injured while working on off-shore drilling platform
exclusively under federal, not state, act).
73. 288 F.2d 542 (9th Cir. 1961) (court, affirming, stressed that all the activities of
the worker were directly concerned with a maritime purpose).
74. 33 U.S.C. § 903(a) (1970).
75. See O'Leary v. Puget Sound Bridge & Dry Dock Co., 349 F.2d 571, 573 (9th Cir.
1965).
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whose inclusion within the term is obvious, is a floating dry dock. This
is the type that may be partially submerged to allow entrance of a
vessel, after which water is pumped out of the ballast tanks until the
dock is clear of water. The second type, which also seems to cause no
controversy,7 6 is a graving dock, which is a permanently fixed basin into
which a ship is floated, after which the water is pumped out, exposing
the underwater portion of the hull. The third type, which has led to
some difference of opinion, is a "marine railway." This is a permanently fixed track that extends from below the water line, where a ship
floats on a cradle which is then pulled out of the water on the tracks,
to a point above, and sometimes a considerable distance from, the water
line. Marine railways have usually been classed as dry docks when
being used for repair purposes, 77 even, in one instance, at a distance of
400 feet from the water line. 78 Moreover, once the apparatus has been
classed as a covered dry dock, it includes the land area under and
around it from which work on the vessel must be performed. Thus, in
Holland v. HarrisonBros. Dry Dock and Repair Yard Inc.,79 an employee engaged in cleaning sand off a barge which was on a marine
railway was injured when he was standing next to barge with both feet
on dry land. The court reasoned that since a marine railway had been
held to be within the Longshoremen's Act coverage, "[any] meaningful
definition of marine railway should include the land immediately adjacent to the tracks that is beneath a ship drawn up on the railway and
that must be used in the course of repairingany ship on the railway."80
However, if a marine railway is used for construction of new vessels
rather than repair of finished vessels, there is authority for denying
such a railway the status of "dry dock." The reason is not so much
derived from the old maritime-but-local distinction between repair and
76. See Gretna Mach. & Iron Works, Inc. v. Neuman, 316 F. Supp. 147 (E.D. La.
1970) discussed in note 81 infra.
77. Avondale Marine Ways, Inc. v. Henderson, 201 F.2d 437 (5th Cir.), affd per
curiam, 346 US. 366 (1953) (dissent argued that a marine railway differs from a dry dock.
Citing Parker and Davis, the dissent further contended that Congress made clear its pur-

pose to permit state compensation protection whenever possible).
Western Boat Bldg. Co. v. O'Leary, 198 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1952) (marine railway, on
which a tugboat was being repaired, which extended into the water, was treated as a
"dry dock"); Holland v. Harrison Bros. Dry Dock & Repair Yard, Inc., 306 F.2d 369 (5th
Cir. 1962); Maryland das. Co. v. Lawson, 101 F.2d 732 (5th Cir. 1939); Continental Cas.
Co. v. Lawson, 64 F.2d 802 (5th Cir. 1933). But see Norton v. Vesta Coal Co., 63 F.2d 165
(3d Cir. 1933).
78. Avondale Marine Ways, Inc. v. Henderson, 201 F.2d 437 (5th Cir.), aff'd per

curiam, 346 US. 366 (1953).
79. 806 F.2d 369 (5th Cir. 1962).
80. Id. at 372 (emphasis in original).
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construction, since it is clear enough that if a regular dry dock was used
for new construction this would not destroy its obvious character as a
dry dock."' Rather the reason is that a marine railway used for new
construction is classified in the trade as a "building way," not as a
species of dry dock. The court that carefully identified the three kinds
of dry dock listed at the outset of this subsection is the court that also
concluded that this kind of building-way marine railway did not fall
into any of the three categories described.8 2 There is contra authority,
however. 83
The Fifth Circuit, which produced the two most inclusive decisions,8 4 embracing marine railways within the term "dry dock" subsequently drew the line at extending the concept to a conveyor belt
system that extended from land onto navigable waters, but that was
permanently fixed to the shore and anchored to the bottom of the
waterway. An accident to a claimant working on this system was held
not to have occurred upon navigable waters. 8
81. Gretna Mach. & Iron Works, Inc. v. Neuman, 316 F. Supp. 147 (E.D. La. 1970)
(claimant was injured in a graving dry dock which was used almost exclusively for new
construction rather than repair. This distinction was held not to take the site of the injury
out of the meaning of the term "dry dock" in the Longshoremen's Act); Kelso Marine,
Inc. v. Hollis, 316 F. Supp. 1271 (S.D. Tex. 1970) (claimant was injured while working on
a barge which was being constructed. The barge was resting on a synchrolift dry dock,
which lifts vessels vertically rather than on horizontally inclined tracks. Injury held to be
within the jurisdiction of the Longshoremen's Act). See also Hansen v. Perth Amboy Dry
Dock Co., 48 N.J. 889, 226 A.2d 4 (1967) (benefits under the Longshoremen's Act paid for
in injury to claimant while he was painting a new ship in dry dock).
Even if it is the dry dock itself that is under construction, the injury is covered. In
Travelers Ins. Co. v. Branham, 136 F.2d 873 (4th Cir. 1943), the dry dock was only 5%
completed at the time the decedent was killed by a fall from a barge inside the dry dock.
Later, when the same dry dock was 62% completed, it was again the scene of an accident.
By this time the water had been pumped out of the area where decedent was working,
but the court held that the decedent was constructively in navigable waters, and permitted
recovery under the Longshoremen's Act. Travelers Ins. Co. v. McManigal, 139 F.2d 949

(4th Cir. 1944).
82. O'Leary v. Puget Sound Bridge & Dry Dock Co., 349 F.2d 571 (9th Cir. 1965)
(claimant was injured while working on a ship that was still on the building way. Held,
a building way is not a dry dock, and the claimant was covered only by the local compensation act). Accord, American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Neuman, 318 F. Supp. 398 (S.D. Ala.
1969).
83. Port Houston Ironworks, Inc. v. Calbeck, 227 F. Supp. 966 (S.D. Tex. 1964)
(award under Longshoremen's Act affirmed for claimant injured while working on building ways).
84. Avondale Marine Ways, Inc. v. Henderson, 201 F.2d 437 (5th Cir.), aff'd per
curiam, 346 U.S. 366 (1953); Holland v. Harrison Bros. Dry Dock & Repair Yard, Inc., 306
F.2d 369 (5th Cir. 1962).
85. Labit v. Carey Salt Co., 421 F.2d 1333 (5th Cir. 1970).
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A "TWILIGHT ZONE" FOR THE
"NAVIGABLE WATERS" TEST?
It was stressed earlier that the twilight zone approach was not designed
to deal with close cases involving the navigable-waters line of demarcation, but to deal with the flood of close cases applying the maritime-butlocal doctrine. However, now that under Calbeck the maritime-but-local
and absence-of-state power tests have no further effect on assumption
of federal jurisdiction, and with the navigable-waters test becoming
decisive as to federal coverage, it would not be surprising to encounter
attempts to soften the hard edges of the navigable-waters line by employing something like the twilight zone approach in close cases.
To identify the precise problem, one must postulate a fact situadon in which the decision on coverage of the state act or the federal
act turns exclusively on the navigable-waters test. For example, suppose
that the question is whether a state act applies to a waterfront worker
who (we will assume for the sake of argument) cannot be reached by
the state on any amount of stretching of the maritime-but-local concept.
There remains, however, the fact that a state can always cover an injury
occurring on land, rather than on navigable waters. The most direct
way, then, to get state coverage would be to establish that the injury
itself lies on the landward side of the Jensen line.
In order to try this out on an actual case, let us suppose that
Holland arose in the form of a claim for state compensation.86 The
activity there involved was repair, not new construction, and consequently the traditional maritime-but-local rule would not help the
claimant. But there he was, with his feet firmly planted on the soil of
the state-how can anyone say that the state cannot take jurisdiction?
Unquestionably a state award of compensation would be upheld on
these facts, although the employee was engaged in maritime employment.sT The actual Holland case involved a claim under the Longshoremen's Act, which was allowed because the marine railway on which
the work was being done was considered to be a "dry dock." It is of
unusual interest that this is one of the first cases (perhaps the only case)
in which the twilight zone doctrine has been applied to the navigablewaters test. The court invoked Moores's Case88 as recognizing a twilight
86.

Holland v. Harrison Bros. Dry Dock & Repair Yard, Inc., 806 F.2d 869 (5th Cir.

1962).
87. See State Indus. Comm'n v. Nordenholt Corp., 259 US. 263 (1922).
88. 323 Mass. 162, 80 N.E.2d 478, aff'd sub nom. Bethlehem Steel Co. v. Moores, 835

U.S. 874 (1948).
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zone that intended "to include within a wide circle of doubt all waterfront cases involving aspects pertaining both to the land and to the
sea where reasonable argument can be made either way."
Another class of cases in which a twilight zone or concurrent
jurisdiction approach should be applied to a decision turning exclusively on the navigable waters test would be the Minnie-Taylor"" category. These cases involve an initial impact which occurred upon land
and a culmination of the injury which occurred upon navigable waters,
or vice versa. If a man comes crashing down onto the solid ground
of a state-no matter where his downward journey began or how maritime his employment was-that state, under modem modes of thought,
should have the right to say that the resulting injury or death was
within the state's jurisdiction. If the federal government wants to assert
jurisdiction also, on the theory that the initial impact took place on
navigable waters, there is no harm done, so long as no attempt is made
to assert that this jurisdiction is exclusive once asserted.
It is no answer to say that the federal government could, if it
wished, constitutionally assume exclusive jurisdiction over maritime
contracts, since it is clear under Johnson that this is not in fact what
Congress has done. It has chosen instead a statutory boundary line
("occurring on navigable waters") well short of the outer limits of its
constitutional power. Consequently, in any litigation over that boundary line the state may assert jurisdiction in close cases without fear that
any over-stepping on its part necessarily raises a constitutional issue,
as the Court in Calbeck made clear about the other boundary line of
"local concern." 90
Unlike the Calbeck opinion, the Johnson opinion throws little
light on the question whether there might be a twilight zone on the
boundary traced by the navigable-waters test. The facts before it
displayed an unmistakable case of land-based injury, and there was
no occasion to speculate about what might be done in close and doubt89. Minnie v. Port Huron Terminal Co., 295 U.S. 647 (1935), T. Smith & Son, Inc. v.
Taylor, 276 U.S. 179 (1928).
90. The Court in Calbeck rejected the argument that federal coverage was bounded
by the "local concern" doctrine:
But that would mean that every litigation raising an issue of federal coverage
would raise an issue of constitutional dimension, with all that that implies; and
that each and every award of federal compensation would equally be a constitutionally premised denial of state competence in a like situation.
370 U.S. at 126.
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ful cases. It may be mentioned, for what it is worth, that the first
headnote in the official report reads:
1. The Longshoremen's Act... does not provide compensation to workmen injured on a pier permanently affxed to land and
hence clearly within the jurisdiction of the State. 91
If the opinion itself contained these exact words, it might be argued
that Johnson's flat abdication of landward coverage applies only to cases
in which state coverage is dear. But in any event, this seems a reasonable and practical interpretation of the decision, since otherwise unclear cases falling in the shadowland along the waterline might go
uncompensated by either federal or state systems.
It is also significant that in connection with its last argument the
dissent adduces the second of the two situations utilized above as examples of the need for recognizing a twilight zone-that of the impactculmination dichotomy:
In addition to the cases being reviewed here, the Court of
Appeals affirmed a judgment in favor of the widow of a longshoreman (238 F. Supp. 78), who, while working on the pier, was struck
by a cable and knocked into the water where he died. It is incongruous to us that in an accident on a pier over navigable waters
coverage of the Act depends on where the body falls after the accident has happend. 92
The incongruity would be lessened somewhat by a recognition
that the principal case's forthright decision was possible because the
facts on land situs were clear, in that both the initial impact and the
culmination were on land, and by a corresponding recognition that in
unclear categories, such as that cited by the dissent, a twilight area
of concurrent jurisdiction must be accepted.
CONCURRENT STATE JURISDICTION IN
TRADITIONAL FEDERAL MARITIME AREAS?
Earlier in this article, the story of the development of the twilight zone
and concurrent jurisdiction doctrines as applied to the maritime-butlocal distinction was suspended to fit the Johnson case into the unfolding pattern. It is now necessary, with all the background in place,
to confront the most troublesome remaining question: How broad is
91.

396 U.S. at 212 (emphasis added).

92. Id. at 225.
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the possible jurisdiction of state acts over maritime injuries that are
now also clearly covered by the Longshoremen's Act under Calbeck?
Conceptually, there are three possible answers. At one end of the
spectrum, it could be said that, by operation of the twilight-zone
principle, the states have in effect concurrent jurisdiction over all maritime injuries also covered by the Longshoremen's Act, including those
incurred in the course of activities, such as ship repair and longshoring,
that previously had been definitely assigned to the Longshoremen's
Act under the maritime-but-local line of cases. At the other extreme,
it could be argued that, since Calbeck, there is now no need for any
state coverage of maritime injuries, and accordingly, Longshoremen's
Act coverage of such injuries should become exclusive, including those
previously within the maritime-but-local exception. In between is the
view that concurrent state jurisdiction should exist in areas where,
under past maritime-but-local decisions, the state jurisdiction either
has been clearly recognized or at least has not been ruled out, but
should stop short of employments that have been judicially placed on
the federal side, like longshoring and ship repair.
The actual contest is between the first and third of these choices.
The first answer could itself perhaps be subdivided. The most farreaching statement would be an affirmative assertion that states have full
concurrent jurisdiction. A less ambitious formulation would put it
this way: States have concurrent jurisdiction over maritime injuries in
employments without regard to whether these employments prior to
Davis had been placed within the federal or state province. So phrased,
the proposition can be supported by an impressive line of decisions. 8
93. Federal: Davis v. Department of Labor & Indus., 317 U.S. 249 (1942); Bethlehem
Steel Co. v. Moores, 335 U.S. 874 (1948); and Baskin v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 338 U.S.
854 (1949); T. Smith & Son, Inc. v. Williams, 275 F.2d 397 (5th Cir. 1960) (employee initiated a compensation suit in the Louisiana state courts. The employer brought an action
in the federal district court to enjoin the state proceeding. On appeal the circuit court
affirmed the denial of an injunction on the grounds that in the "twilight zone" the employees have a right to have a case-by-case determination of whether their claims arose
out of maritime activities exclusively under the Longshoremen's Act or out of activities
sufficiently local to apply state compensation. The injunction was denied even though the
particular activity, loading of a vessel, as federal courts have determined, rests exclusively
within the federal statute). Cf. Flowers v. Travelers Ins. Co., 258 F.2d 220 (5th Cir. 1958);
Noah v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 267 F.2d 218 (5th Cir. 1959); Thibodeaux v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 276 F.2d 42 (5th Cir. 1960). See also dictum in Michigan Mut. Liab. Co. v.
Arrien, 344 F.2d 640 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 835 (1965) (claimant, a longshoreman,
was working on a skid which protruded from a wharf over navigable waters, when he was
hit by cargo that fell from a broken pallet. The principal issue had to do with the navigable waters test, but the court, in sustaining an award under the Longshoremen's Act,
went on to add: "We do not question that the skid on which Parisi was injured was
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There is also, however, substantial authority for the third answer-that
state acts cannot extend to employments, such as loading and unloading
ships and repairing completed vessels, that have been definitely assigned to federal jurisdiction by judicial decisionY4
sufficiently connected with the land to sustain an award under the State Compensation
Act." Id. at 645. The claimant had in fact previously recovered under the state act).
Louisiana: Richard v. Lake Charles Stevedores, Inc., 95 So. 2d 830 (La. App. 1957),
cert. denied, 355 U.S. 952 (1958) (a longshoreman was injured while working in the hold
of a ship lying in navigable waters. It was held to be error to dismiss the claim on the
ground that the Longshoremen's Act was the exclusive remedy); Sullivan v. Travelers
Ins. Co., 95 So. 2d 834 (La. App. 1957). These cases were in effect overruled in Ellis v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 123 So. 2d 780 (La. App. 1960), aff'd, 241 La. 433, 129 So. 2d 729 (1961).
Cf. Narcisse v. American Sugar Ref. Co., 128 So. 2d 689 (La. App. 1961); Mackey v. Standard Stevedoring Co., 131 So. 2d 123 (La. App. 1961); Robinson v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co.,

170 So. 2d 248 (La. App. 1964).
Massachusetts: Moores's Case, 823 Mass. 462, 80 N.E.2d 478 (1948), aff'd sub nom.
Bethlehem Steel Co. v. Moores, 835 U.S. 874 (1948). See text accompanying note 82 supra.
New Jersey: De Graw v. Todd Shipyards Co., 134 N.J.L. 815, 47 A.2d 838 (Ct. Err. &
App.), cert. denied, 829 U.S. 759 (1946) (a pipefitter injured while working on a completed
ship lying in navigable waters); Allisot v. Federal Shipbldg. & Drydock Co., 4 N.J. 445, 73
A.2d 153 (1950) (painting a completed vessel); Kelly v. R.T.C. Shipbldg. Corp., 87 N.J.
Super. 813, 209 A.2d 840 (Super. Ct., App. Div. 1965) (claimant was injured while working
on a boat in dry dock. The vessel was undergoing extensive repairs, including a change
from steam to diesel power. The court distinguished this from Flowers v. Travelers Ins.
Co., 258 F.2d 220 (5th Cir. 1958), [discussed in note 94 infra] by holding that these extensive repairs were "tantamount to conversion," and claimant could avail himself of either
the state compensation act or the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Act). See also
Szumski v. Dale Boat Yards, Inc., 48 N.J. 401, 226 A.2d 11 (1967), reeg 90 N.J. Super. 86
(Super. Ct., App. Div.), 216 A.2d 256 (1966) (decedent, a boatyard worker, suffered a fatal
heart attack while at sea on a small boat he was ferrying to another yard, although 90%
of his time was spent on land. Held, New Jersey had jurisdiction to apply its compensation act. The court below had held that the sole remedy was under the Longshoremen's
Act, although the event took place on the high seas). Cf. Gaddies v. Trenton Marine Terminal, Inc., 86 N.J. Super. 125, 206 A.2d 180 (Super. Ct., App. Div. 1965); Green v. Simpson
& Brown Constr. Co., 24 N.J. Super. 422 (Essex County Ct., L. Div.), rev'd, 26 NJ. Super.
806, 97 A.2d 704 (Super. Ct., App. Div. 1958).
New York: Simis v. Curran, 81 App. Div. 2d 697, 295 N.Y.S.2d 817 (1968) (claimant
was standing on a barge assisting in driving piles for the extension of a pier. Claimant's
work held not so directly related to navigation or commerce as to exclude him from coverage under the New York Workmen's Compensation Law; the claim was allowed as a "tvilight zone case"); Comm'r of Taxation 9- Fin. v. Oceanic Serv. Corp., 276 App. Div. 725, 97
N.Y.S.2d 401 (1950) (ship's guard apparently fell from a ship moored in the North River).
See also Eldredge v. Weidler, 274 App. Div. 138, 81 N.YS.2d 58 (1948) (housing construction worker drowned while rowing out to secure a small pleasure craft against an approaching storm).
Rhode Island: Behrle v. London Guarantee &.Acc. Co., 76 R.I. 106, 68 A.2d 63 (1949),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 928 (1950) (involving repairs on a completed vessel).
Texas: Indemnity Ins. Co. of North America v. Marshall, 308 S.W.2d 174 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1957) (pipefitter injured while working on a completed vessel lying in a floating dry
dock). Cf. Warner v. Travelers Ins. Co., 882 S.W.2d 789 (rex. Civ. App. 1960).
94. Federal: Flowers v. Travelers Ins. Co., 258 F.2d 220 (5th Cir. 1958) (welder in-
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Since this area of law has been dominated-indeed created-from

the beginning by the Supreme Court, by far the most important inquiry is what that court has revealed as to its actual or probable position
jured while making repairs on an ocean-going tanker in a floating dry dock held to be
within the exclusive coverage of the Longshoremen's Act. There is no twilight zone for
injuries sustained on navigable waters while employee is engaged in essential repairs to
an existing vessel); Noah v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 267 F.2d 218 (5th Cir. 1959) (in the
original hearing of the case, 265 F.2d 547 (1959), the court held that a longshoreman
drowned while unloading a vessel was in the twilight zone. Accordingly, the decedent's
dependents could elect to seek an award under either the Longshoremen's Act or the
Louisiana act. On rehearing, the court reversed itself, two judges dissenting, and held the
federal act to be the exclusive remedy). See also Thibodeaux v. J. Ray McDermott & Co.,
276 F.2d 42 (5th Cir. 1960) (it was not dear whether the decedent had fallen from a river
bank or a barge. The court said that if he fell from the barge, the Longshoremen's Act
would be his exclusive remedy; if from the bank, the state act would be his exclusive
remedy).
Louisiana: Ellis v. Travelers Ins. Co., 123 So. 2d 780 (La. App. 1960), afl'd, 241 La. 438,
129 So. 2d 729 (1961) (employee injured aboard a vessel engaged in interstate commerce.
His duties were wholly maritime in nature, and his employer was engaged in fulfilling
maritime contracts. The court held that the employee's exclusive remedy was under the
Longshoremen's Act); Narcisse v. American Sugar Ref. Co., 128 So. 2d 689 (La. App. 1961)
(claimant's usual duties consisted of unloading barges that were used to transport products
on navigable waters. He also worked at times inside the plant. He was injured while performing his usual duties. The court held that his recovery was limited to the provisions
of the Longshoremen's Act within the theory of the "twilight zone"); Mackey v. Standard
Stevedoring Co., 131 So. 2d 123 (La. App. 1961) (stevedore injured in the hold of a ship
afloat on the Mississippi River and engaged in interstate commerce. Held, exclusive recovery under the Longshoremen's Act). See also Robinson v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 170 So.
2d 243 (La. App. 1964).
New Jersey: Gaddies v. Trenton Marine Terminal, Inc., 86 N.J. Super. 125, 206 A.2d
180 (Super. Ct., App. Div. 1965) (claimant worked on docks and in warehouses and occasionally worked on board ships tied up at the docks. He was injured on board a ship
while helping to unload. Held to be exclusively under the Longshoremen's Act). The
court, admitting that the "twilight zone" doctrine had been applied to workmen per.
forming alterations or repairs on completed ships, as in Allisot v. Federal Shipbldg. &
Drydock Co., 4 N.J. 445, 73 A.2d 153 (1950) and in Dunleavy v. Tietjen & Lang Dry Docks,
17 N.J. Super. 76, 85 A.2d 343 (Hudson County Ct., L. Div. 1951), aff'd, 20 NJ. Super. 486,
90 A.2d 84 (Super. Ct., App. Div. 1952), argued that these cases were distinguishable because they did not involve loading and unloading of ships. But this misses the principle
involved: categories previously held federal are either outside the twilight zone or they
are not. Both ship repair and ship loading had equally been held federal. Once that line
has been broken by a holding that a ship repair case can be treated as a "twilight zone"
case, there is no further ground for distinguishing an unloading case. This being so,
Gaddies appears to be discredited by the subsequent New Jersey Supreme Court case of
Hansen v. Perth Amboy Dry Dock Co., 48 NJ. 389, 226 A.2d 4 (1967) (upholding a state
award following federal benefits, and stressing that the distinction between working in
new ships and old ships no longer makes sense). That court does mention Gaddies without
disapproving it, bui in principle it is difficult to see how Gaddies can survive in view of
the overall approach and tone of Hansen.
Green v. Simpson & Brown Constr. Co., 24 NJ. Super. 422, 94 A.2d 693 (Essex County
Ct., L, Div.), rev'd on other grounds, 26 N.J. Super. 306, 97 A.2d 704 (Super. Ct., App. Div.
1953) (claimant was to remain aboard ship to act as caretaker but was found drowned.
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on this controversy. It is true that the Court has never formally
addressed itself to this exact question, as it has to the questions in
Calbeck and Johnson. What can be said with confidence is that everything it has said, or, more exactly, everything it has done or omitted
to do, places it on the side of the first answer-that of not limiting state
jurisdiction by pre-Davis tests. By the same token, nothing it has said
or done since Davis has lent any support to the view that it would
accept the third answer-that is, strike down state awards for injuries
during ship-loading or repair. It has already been pointed out that in
Moores the court upheld a state award for injury in the course of a
ship-repair activity. For present purposes, two features of this case
must be stressed. One is that the state decision was explicitly based on a
sweeping theory that left the states unbound "even though a careful examination of numerous previous decisions might disclose an apparent
weight of authority one way or the other."9 5 The second point to note
is that the Court did not content itself with denying certiorari-it
affirmed. True, the affirmance was per curiam, but, unlike the noncommittal effect of a denial of certiorari, such an affirmance signifies
unmistakable approval of the result. Moreover, the per curiam device
also indicates that the court could not have had any serious disagreement with the rationale announced below, since if it had it would presumably have said so, lest its per curiam affirmance be misunderstood.
Then, the following year, the Supreme Court went even further
in Baskin, another ship repair case, and not only in effect told California
to make an award it had denied, but also cited it to Moores, and in a
subsequent appeal again invoked Moores as well as Davis9 6 It is difficult
to see how anything could be plainer than the Court's message that it
will not strike down state awards within previously-federal waterfront
categories, nor will it allow state courts to do so on some mistaken
theory that the Supreme Court had told them they must.
Every subsequent action of the Court has been consistent with
this interpretation. Perhaps the most far-reaching statement on the
The court said that if his death occurred while he was on land or if on the vessel if it
was in local activity there would be jurisdiction in the state courts).
Texas: Warner v. Travelers Ins. Co., 332 S.W.2d 789 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960) (claimant

spent one-third of his time on dry land and two-thirds working on ships in navigable
waters. At the time of his accident he was caulking rivets on the hull of an ocean-going

vessel lying in navigable waters. Held, the twilight zone does not extend to such purely
maritime work, and the exclusive remedy was the federal Longshoremen's Act).
95. See full quotation at text accompanying note 34 supra.
96. See text accompanying notes 26-38 supra.
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scope of concurrent state jurisdiction is to be found in Richard v. Lake
9 7
where the activity was the other classical
Charles Stevedores, Inc.,
category of federal jurisdiction-longshoring. Certiorari was denied.
Certiorari was also denied in Behrle v. London Guarantee & Accident
Co., Ltd.,98 another ship-repair case.
What, to counterbalance this, can be adduced in the way of
Supreme Court actions indicating the opposite view? No attempt has
been made to carry any of the decisions adopting the competing view
to the Court, and consequently we do not even have whatever hint
might be drawn from the granting or denying of certiorari. But, more
significantly, when we face the decisive question of what the Court
has in fact done to interfere with application of state laws on grounds
related to the local-concern doctrine, we discover that the Court has
not forbidden a state to apply its compensation law to a waterfront
injury on these grounds in over 40 years-not just since Davis, but
since only a few years after the Longshoremen's Act was passed. 00
Such agonizing as has been done over this problem in the last
couple of generations has been done, not by the Supreme Court, but
by several state courts, and, within the federal system, chiefly by the
Fifth Circuit. Louisiana, New Jersey and Texas have produced decisions facing both ways. 00 So has the Fifth Gircuit' 01 -indeed, it once
achieved this feat within a single case. 10 2 The Fifth Circuit had always
been unhappy with the twilight-zone approach, and it is of some
interest that it was this circuit that supplied the decision' 08 that was
reversed by the Supreme Court in Calbeck. Here the Fifth Circuit was
dealing with, in a sense, the same question, i.e., whether both federal
and state acts could apply to a situation that had been authoritatively
assigned to the federal or state category by earlier cases. In this instance
the activity was construction work on a new vessel, and the Fifth Circuit
held that this activity had been so dearly categorized that it did not
fall within the twilight zone, and consequently the Longshoremen's
Act could not apply. Of course, by reversing this ruling, the Supreme
97. 95 So. 2d 830 (La. App. 1957), cert. denied, 355 US. 952 (1958).
98. 76 R.I. 106, 68 A.2d 63 (1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 928 (1950). Certiorari was
also denied in the pre-Moores case of De Craw v. Todd Shipyards Co., 134 N.J.L. 315, 47
A.2d 338 (Ct. Err. & App.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 759 (1946).
99. See notes 10-21 supra.
100. See notes 93-94 supra.
101. See notes 93-94 supra, under the heading Federal.
102. See Noah v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 267 F.2d 218 (5th Cir. 1959).
103. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Calbeck, 293 F2d 52 (5th Cir. 1961).
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Court did not necessarily imply that a symmetrical result must follow
as to cases traditionally falling on the state side of the line, since there
were arguments, such as the legislative history of the Longshoremen's
Act, that would not apply in the same way to the issue of affirmative
state competence. But a strong case can be made for the proposition
that the dominant rationale of all the Court cases from Davis through
Moores and Baskin to Calbeck is one that also applies to the present
issue of state jurisdiction. That rationale can be bluntly stated: The
Court simply does not want to be bothered with hair-splitting and
archaic distinctions between activities of local concern and activities
prejudicing the uniformity of maritime law, especially when what is at
stake is no longer some compensation versus no compensation, but
merely the possible differential between two compensation acts. It must
be recalled that the main body of law that is still invoked in these cases
was built up before the Longshoremen's Act was passed, at a time when
the effect of holding an activity to be non-local was to deprive the
injured worker of all protection. It is not surprising that, although a
few such cases reached the Supreme Court after passage of the Act in
1927, they dropped off almost completely after 1930.
In the discussion of Calbeck earlier, it was mentioned that there
were two main grounds for the decision. The first, ensuring coverage
of workers in navigable waters, is not relevant here. But the second isavoiding the necessity of handling coverage questions on a case-by-case
basis, with all the administrative burdensomeness and endless uncertainty that this entails. By immediately invoking Davis, a case involving not affirmative federal coverage but affirmative state coverage,
in support of this ground and stating that it was "entirely consistent with
our conclusion" in Calbeck, the Court goes a long way toward creating
the impression that the rationale of Calbeck cuts in both directions.
Since the quantum of doubt or certainty is about the same in the earlier
decisions categorizing activities as state or federal-i.e., new ship construction as state, and ship repair and longshoring as federal-no real
distinction can be drawn on the ground that the federal categories
are somehow less uncertain than the state. If there is enough doubt in
any of them to come within the Davis-Moores-Calbeckrationale, there
is enough in all.
To all this must be added, if one is attempting to predict what
the Court would say today in dealing directly with the issue of concurrent state jurisdiction, the fact that the Court's entire attitude
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towards conflicts has been transformed during this same period from
one based on conceptualism to one based on legitimate interests. 10 4 In
the case of state-versus-state conflicts, the focal point of constitutional
conceptualism was the full faith and credit clause; in the present conflicts problem, it was the uniformity of maritime law. Bradford Electric
Light Co. v. Clapper °5 was the high point of the former, after which
it was "downhill all the way" for conceptualism. It was decided in
1932, at about the point at which the last of the Supreme Court decisions striking down state awards under the maritime uniformity
concept began to disappear from sight. Nor is it a coincidence that
0
Pacific Employers Insurance Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission,"'
which for all practical purposes buried Bradford, came out only three
years before Davis, which similarly buried the conceptual maritimebut-local approach. All this reflects a shift away from the perhaps
intellectually-titillating game of drawing medieval distinctions based
on abstract concepts, and toward the serious business of getting social
insurance benefits paid with a minimum of administrative fuss and
litigation. After all, the Supreme Court, with its fantastically overloaded docket, has better ways to spend its time than in tracing ghostly
definitional boundaries between, say, the "repair" of a ship and its
"reconversion," and too much self-respect and sense of humor to tell
us with a straight face that awarding state workmen's compensation in
the former case would shatter the uniformity of maritime law, while a
similar award in the latter case would not.
SUCCESSIVE AND SUPPLEMENTARY AWARDS
The inevitable comparison that springs to mind while viewing these
swiftly-moving developments is this: Will the final state-versus-longshoremen's rule turn out to be similar to the state-versus-state rule as
culminating in the McCartin case? 07 Its constitutional basis, of course,
can never be identical; but some significant points of resemblance in
ultimate result can be detected. First, each jurisdiction decides for itself
whether it shall apply its own law, and in the vast bulk of cases its
determination proves to be final. Second, Supreme Court cases which
formerly were thought to set an overriding body of rules controlling
104. See LamsoN, supra note 55, at § 86.
105. 286 US. 145 (1932).
106. 806 US. 493 (1939).
107. Industrial Comm'n v. McCartin, 330 U.S. 622 (1947) (upheld a supplementary

award in Wisconsin, after an approved full settlement and payment of compensation under
Illinois law, as not violative of the full faith and credit clause). See LAwoN, supra note 55,
at § 85.20.
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indistinguishable fact situations are no longer treated as controllingjust as in the state conflicts story the Court abandoned its attempt to
create a single conflicts rule binding on the states. Third, there is a
resemblance between the connection that must exist between a state
and a maritime employment to come within the "twilight zone," and
the connection that must exist between a state and an employment to
give it a "more-than-casual interest" under the state conflicts rule. The
former is sometimes phrased as "local concern"; the latter is "local
interest." The general idea seems to be the same: a recognition of the
right of the local community to confer the kind of protection it thinks
wise on persons or employments in which it has a legitimate interest.
This interest is just as real and just as "local" whether a local plumber
is putting the final touches on an uncompleted vessel or repairing an
old vessel.
A. STATE AWARD FOLLOWED BY FEDERAL
The ultimate question suggested by the parallel between the developments in the state-versus-state conflicts and state-longshoremen's conflicts doctrines is whether the full implications of concurrent jurisdiction are to be followed out, in the form of successive and supplementary awards as under the McCartin case, always, of course, with
credit against the second award for benefits under the first so as to avoid
double recovery.
When the sequence takes the form of state benefits followed by
federal, there is strong authority, beginning with Calbeck itself, for
the conclusion that acceptance of state benefits does not constitute a
binding election barring award of federal benefits. 08 One of the welders
108. Calbeck v. Travelers Ins. Co., 370 U.S. 114 (1962); Western Boat Bldg. Co. v.
O'Leary, 198 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1952) (claimant was injured on a marine railway. He filed
a compensation claim under the state act of Washington, and payments were made to
him under that act. While still receiving compensation he made claim under the Longshoremen's Act, and was awarded compensation. The employer's petition to enjoin enforcement was denied by the district court, and the denial was affirmed. This case indicates that the twilight zone doctrine does not mean that the jurisdiction first making the
award will be the only one upheld. It takes the view, rather, that the federal court should
decide the dispute when both state and Longshoremen's Act payments are being made,
and seems to interpret Davis to mean that, in determining this dispute, the decision of
the deputy commissioner that the case is under Longshoremen's Act should be upheld
except in case of manifest error); Gulf Oil Corp. v. O'Keeffe, 242 F. Supp. 881 (E.D.S.C.
1965) (decedent fell from a barge and drowned in navigable waters. His widow accepted
an award under the South Carolina Workmen's Compensation Law. The court held that
this did not constitute a binding election, and thus claimant could recover under the
Longshoremen's Act); Michigan Mut. Liab. Co. v. Arrien, 233 F. Supp. 496 (S.D.N.Y.
1964) (discussed in note 93 supra). Cf. Windrem v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 293 F. Supp. 1
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involved in Calbeck'01 had received medical and compensation benefits
under the Louisiana act and had accepted checks which stated the
payments were made under the state act. The Court held "that acceptance of the payments does not constitute an election of the remedy
under state law precluding recovery under the Longshoremen's Act.
Nothing in the statute requires a contrary result." 10
When the issue turns on election, whether benefits were accepted
with or without a formal award is not important, as long as there is
knowledge that the payments were made under the state act; there
have been federal awards following receipt of state benefits pursuant to
awards:"' as well as those paid voluntarily, as in Calbeck.
When an actual state award has been made, there may arise, in
addition to election, the argument that the state award establishes that
the state act may validly apply, and that therefore the Longshoremen's
Act by its terms is inapplicable. In Shea v. Texas Employers' Insurance
Association, 12 claimant had been injured while working on board a
vessel under construction but afloat upon navigable waters. A claim
was filed and litigated under the Texas Workmen's Compensation Act,
and claimant was awarded benefits. Several days after receiving this
award, claimant filed suit under the Longshoremen's Act. Subsequent
(D.N.J. 1968) (claimant injured in a "twilight zone" accident received federal compensation benefits, and then sought, litigated and received payments pursuant to the New Jersey
Workmen's Compensation Act. Claimant's litigation of state claim held to constitute a
binding election and to bar further benefits under the Longshoremen's Act); and cf. as to
the Defense Base Act, which incorporates the remedies of the Longshoremen's Act, Flying
Tiger Lines, Inc. v. Landy, 370 F.2d 46 (9th Cir. 1966) (decedent was a pilot for a firm
ferrying military personnel for the US. Air Force. This was held to bring him under the
Defense Base Act. A prior claim for death benefits had been made under the California
Workmen's Compensation Act, and benefits had been awarded. This was held not to predude an award under the Defense Base Act, since the question of jurisdiction had not
been raised and fully litigated during the initial claim, thus making res judicata inapplicable. Furthermore, there is no "twilight zone" rule in this area, so the claimants could
not be held to have elected between two possible remedies, since the Defense Base Act was
exclusive).
109. This point arose in the companion case of Avondale Shipyards, Inc. v. Donovan,
293 F.2d 51 (5th Cir. 1961).
110. 370 US. at 131. The Court adds:
And we agree that the circumstances do not support a finding of a binding election to look solely to the state law for recovery. Massachusetts Bonding & Insurance Co. v. Lawson, 149 F.2d 853; Newport News Shipbuilding &rDry Dock Co. v.
O'Hearne, 192 F.2d 968; Western Boat Building Co. v. O'Leary, 198 F.2d 409.
111. See Western Boat Bldg. Co. v. O'Leary, 198 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1952); Michigan
Mut. Liab. Co. v. Arrien, 233 F. Supp. 469 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); and Gulf Oil Corp. v. O'Keeffe,
242 F. Supp. 881 (E.D.S.C. 1965); but cf. Windrem v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 293 F. Supp. 1
(D.N.J.1968).
112. 383 F.2d 16 (5th Cir. 1967).
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to the state award, and prior to the award of benefits under the Longshoremen's Act, the Supreme Court in Calbeck reversed the prior law,
and held that an employee injured while working on an uncompleted
vessel afloat on navigable waters was entitled to benefits under the
Longshoremen's Act. Since at the time claimant litigated his state claim
there was apparently no other choice open to him, he could not, said
the court, be held to have made an election of remedies. However,
since the Longshoremen's Act is, by its own terms, only applicable
where a state act cannot be validly applied, and since the Texas
litigation had determined that a state act could apply, the court concluded that claimant could not recover additional benefits under the
Longshoremen's Act.
If the Fifth Circuit had studied the reversal of its own decision
in Calbeck with a little more care, especially the dissent, it could not
have reached this conclusion. The test whether state law may validly
be applied was in effect obliterated by Calbeck. The dissent says so in
blunt language:
"By its terms, the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act does not apply 'if recovery for the disability or
death through workmen's compensation proceedings may . . .
validly be provided by State law" ......

Today the Court simply

removes these 'terms' from the Act. 113
The dissent then goes on to advance precisely the argument later relied
on by the Fifth Circuit in Shea:
In one of the cases before us the claimant has actually been paid
benefits under the Louisiana Compensation Act. In the other a
claim under the Texas Act is pending and would dearly be
allowed.... These cases, therefore, were not by any stretch of the
imagination within the twilight zone. The Federal Act is thus by
its terms inapplicable 1 4
But, since those terms have just been said to have been removed from
the Act, the argument falls.
A second flaw in the Shea reasoning is the assumption that, even
if the "terms" remained in the Act, the federal courts would be bound
by a state finding on the point. But the issue at stake is the constitutional limit of state power under the federal constitution-an issue on
which the state court's decision is certainly not binding on the federal
113. 370 U.S. at 137 (emphasis in original).

114. Id. at 138.
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courts, as the Supreme Court's decisions make abundantly clear. In
fact, to allow the states to make a binding decision on when their acts
are "validly" applicable could be attacked as an unconstitutional
delegation of the function of fixing the boundaries of federal maritime
power as applied in the Longshoremen's Act.
B.

FEDERAL AwARD FOLLOWED BY STATE

Prior to Davis, if the federal award came first, followed by a state award,
there would have been difficulty sustaining the second award. The
reason would have been that the first award would necessarily have
involved a federal determination that the state act could not validly
apply-a determination that would be binding on the state courts as
being based on the federal constitution and as asserting federal supremacy in the maritime area. But after Davis, this would not necessarily
follow in the twilight zone, and after Calbeck it would not follow at
all, since the absence-of-state-power test became irrelevant. With this
test out of the way, then, there appears to be no obstacle to a subsequent and supplementary state award. In Hansen v. Perth Amboy
Dry Dock Co.,L"5 claimant was injured while painting a new ship in
dry dock. Benefits were paid under the Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act, and claim was then made under the New
Jersey act. Claimant worked several weeks a year on shore, and a substantial part of his work was on new vessels. His contract was based in
New Jersey and not transitory, and his employer had substantial
physical assets on land in New Jersey. The court held that the employment relation was sufficiently local so as to give New Jersey a valid
interest in applying its compensation act, and benefits were awarded
under the New Jersey act.
Although the language of "localism" is used, note that the operative
factor has become the modem conflicts concept of "valid interest." In
an earlier decision, New Jersey had reached a different result in a shiprepair case."" But, although Hansen involved new ship construction,
the court makes it clear that this ancient new-ship-versus-old-ship
115. 48 N.J. 389, 226 A.2d 4 (1967).
116. Dunleavy v. Tietjen & Lang Dry Docks, 17 NJ. Super. 76, 85 A.2d 343 (Hudson
County Ct., L. Div. 1951), aff'd, 20 NJ. Super. 486, 90 A.2d 84 (Super. Ct., App. Div. 1952)
(claimant injured while doing repair work on a vessel filed a state claim, discontinued it,
then filed under the federal act, and had received payments during his disability. Thereafter he again filed a state claim. Held, since proceedings had gone forward and payments
made under the Longshoremen's Act, the federal court had exclusive and final jurisdiction
of his claim).
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dichotomy is not the controlling consideration in the era of "valid
state interest." Surely all the same elements of valid state interest could
easily have been found if Hansen had been painting an old ship instead
of a new one. Moreover, all the elements of legitimate state interest that
have been recognized since Alaska Packers"17 could be invoked here,
such as the interest in caring for an injured man within the jurisdiction,
the interest in having his local medical bills paid, the interest in not
having him become a charge on the state, and so on. Postulate, for
the sake of argument, that in some particular the state statute might
grant significantly more protection than the Longshoremen's Act, such
as higher maximum benefits in New Jersey or New York, or more
complete rehabilitation rights in Rhode Island. It could be urged that
these states have a valid interest in having this degree of protection
afforded workers injured along their waterfront.
A fortiori,if the prior federal action has taken the form of a denial
of benefits on procedural grounds, the effect should not be to foreclose
a later state award in a case in which the state would not have hesitated
to make an award if the claim had originally been brought under state
8
law."
CONCURRENT JURISDICTION AND
COMMON-LAW SUITS
If a case falls within the twilight-zone or concurrent-jurisdiction category, and if the employer has failed to elect compensation coverage
under the state act, the employee may maintain against the employer
the kind of common-law suit provided by the state act as a penalty for
such non-election even if the employee could have recovered compensation under the Longshoremen's Act. In the Supreme Court decision establishing this proposition,"1 9 the claimant had been injured
117. Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 294 U.S. 552 (1935).
118. Bryce v. Todd Shipyard, 17 App. Div. 2d 666, 229 N.Y.S.2d 998 (1962) (claimant
applied for compensation for loss of hearing under the Longshoremen's Act in 1950. The
claim was rejected for failure to file in time and properly to notify the employer of the
injury. He continued working until 1958 when, after retirement, he claimed compensation
for the same amount of hearing loss under the New York compensation act. The court
held that the claimant's employment duties came within the "twilight zone" and, therefore, the dismissal of the Longshoreman's claim on procedural grounds was not res judicata
on the issue of injury, nor did it establish jurisdictional preeminence by the federal statute.
Benefits under the New York act affirmed).
119. Hahn v. Ross Island Sand 9. Gravel Co., 858 U.S. 272 (1959). Cf. the earlier
contra case of Chappell v. C.D. Johnson Lumber Corp., 112 F. Supp. 625 (D. Ore. 1958)
(holding that if the employee was not covered by state compensation it made no difference
whether at the time of the injury he was in an exclusive federal area or within the twi-
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while engaged in loading activities connected with dredging operations
on a barge on navigable waters in Oregon. The employer was covered
by the Longshoremen's Act, but, as the Oregon Act permits, he had
elected not to be covered by the Oregon compensation statute. The
consequence of this election was that the employer was subject to a
tort action without benefit of common-law defenses. The employee
could have brought a claim under the Longshoremen's Act, but he
chose to proceed under the state act, and accordingly sued the employer
in tort. The Oregon Supreme Court dismissed the suit on the ground
that loading a vessel on navigable waters fell exclusively within the
Longshoremen's Act. But even if the state statute could have applied
under the twilight-zone doctrine, the state court indicated that it would
not have accepted plaintiff's contention that this would require the acceptance of the state act in toto, including the privilege of suing a nonelecting employer at common law. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the facts fell within the twilight-zone area, and that neither
the Constitution nor the Longshoremen's Act contained anything that
would bar the prosecution of any remedy claimant had been given
under state law.
Once the case is categorized as falling within the twilight zonewhich should cause no shock after Moores and Baskin-the rest of the
decision seems to follow inevitably. Part of the affirmative remedy
granted by Oregon is a common-law suit against non-electing employers-and not just an ordinary common-law suit, but one with the
valuable additional feature, conferred as part of the same compensation
statute, of freedom from the common-law defenses. The state court
argued that the purpose of the twilight-zone doctrine was to permit a
choice between compensation acts, rather than between a compensation
act on one hand and a common-law action on the other. This is a gratuitous conclusion with nothing to support it in either law or policy.
The concept of a common-law action without benefit of common-law
defenses is itself an invention and creation of the compensation statute.
Its purpose is directly tied to that of the compensation act, since it is
the principal incentive to drive employers into election of compensation
coverage. The alternative to the final holding would have been
light zone. An employee of a lumber yard company was injured while working on a
barge on a navigable stream. State compensation was not available because the employer
had elected not to come within the Oregon act. Common-law suit was held barred because
his remedy was under the Longshoremen's Act. Citing the Jensen case, the court held that
the rights of the parties were clearly within the admiralty jurisdiction and outside the
reach of the state compensation laws).
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federal interference to impede the operation of this incentive. Assume,
arguendo, that the state benefits in a case of this kind were markedly
higher than the federal. This would mean that employers could evade
their statutory obligation to pay the higher state benefits by providing
the lower federal benefits-and in the process also evade the state
penalty provided for non-election.
Another way to put the matter is that the twilight-zone doctrine
was designed to increase the claimant's rights, not to restrict them.
This is in the spirit of the earlier holding that, in the extremely close
navigable-waters situs problem presented when the original impact is
on land and the subsequent injury takes the form of a fall into navigable
waters, the plaintiff will be given the benefit of the doubt and a finding
of injury on navigable waters will not be made for the purpose of defeating an action for damages under state law. There is also a similarity
in spirit-although accompanied by obvious differences in statutory
background-between Hahn and a 1968 decision 120 holding that, in a
case in which both Oregon and Idaho could take jurisdiction (indeed
claim had been made in Idaho and some benefits had been paid), a
common-law suit could be brought against the non-electing employer
in Oregon for an injury received in Idaho, because of the significant
contacts of Oregon with the episode. Note that in both cases there was
simultaneous coverage by two different compensation acts, and that the
locus of injury was within the physical jurisdiction of the other act.
Perhaps the most interesting similarity lies in the readiness of the court
to conclude that, once the Oregon act was applicable at all, the common-law suit it authorized against a non-electing employer followed
as a matter of course.
MERITS OF PRESENT POSITION
The complexity of the story that has unfolded since Jensen is the result
of the fact that at different times, and sometimes at the same time, there
has been stirred into the mixture a variety of different objectives and
motives: conceptual constitutional soundness; avoidance of administrative burden and appellate litigation; some bias in favor of state
coverage where possible; some inclination to give the claimant the
benefit of the doubt; and, most recently, a search for precision of
identification of federal or state areas of coverage. If symmetry were
the only value that mattered, one final step would appear sorely tempt120.

Davis v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 289 F. Supp. 835 (D. Ore. 1968).
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ing. This would be to abolish all state jurisdiction over injuries on
navigable waters.
Three of the four parts of the pattern to achieve maximum simplicity and minimum overlap are already in place. State acts, of course,
can and usually do cover all injuries on land or on extensions of land
such as piers. The Longshoremen's Act, under Johnson, does not cover
any injuries on land or extensions of land. The Longshoremen's Act
under Calbeck does cover all injuries on navigable waters. The missing
fourth piece would, of course, be: State acts do not cover any injuries
on navigable waters, not even those considered "of local concern."
Such a move would undoubtedly require legislation, since to
achieve it judicially it would entail overruling a half-century's accumulation of cases, and since, for reasons to be noted presently, such a
drastic judicial move-although not completely unheard of-would
not have behind it the weight of policy pressures that is necessary for
such a sharp break with precedent. And, although the notorious legislative inertia in this field makes the chances of legislative change remote, the posing of the possibility helps set the framework for a brief
overall appraisal of the merits of the existing set of rules.
A good argument can be made that if we had the whole job to do
over again in proper historical sequence, this might well be the pattern
that would emerge. That is, if the Longshoremen's Act had been passed
immediately after Jensen, there would have been no need to apply and
develop the maritime-but-local exception in this context, and no need
to write the absence-of-state-power requirement into the act; in short,
the act's coverage could have been made clearly exclusive as to all
injuries on navigable waters, and we would have been spared the whole
tortured story.
But we cannot escape history, and we do not begin with a clean
slate. In particular, we would begin now with a somewhat different set
of values and objectives. Of these, the most cogent would be the
recognition of the right of a state having a legitimate interest in an
injury to apply its compensation remedies to that injury-even at the
expense of accepting duplicate or multiple jurisdiction and consequent
successive and supplementary awards. What disadvantage must be
weighed against the advantage of allowing states this privilege, even
vis--vis the federal Longshoremen's Act? So far as the employer is
concerned, the worst that can happen to him is no more noxious than
the worst that can happen under the McCartin rule: He ends by giving
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the employee the benefit of the act that happens to be more favorable
to him. The assumption of the necessary insurance coverage is neither
121
inconvenient nor unduly onerous.
As to the virtues of predictability and precision, if full concurrent
state coverage is the rule, as the present analysis concludes, rather than
coverage still partly curtailed by remnants of the local-concern doctrine,
then there is no particular advantage either way: One hundred percent
concurrent state coverage is just as exact and definite as zero state
coverage. What is lost by not putting the fourth piece-abolition of
state coverage of maritime injuries-into place is not precision but
aesthetics. And for some years aesthetics has been near the bottom of
the hierarchy of values affecting the judicial process.
Moreover, it is somewhat misleading to suggest that perfect precision would result from a sharp division of coverage based on situs
of injury. It has already been shown that this test, seemingly so physically self-evident, has encountered such troublesome borderline cases
that a twilight-zone doctrine might still be necessary on the navigable
waters front.
In addition, the drawing of too-bright lines between areas of
coverage unavoidably increases the risk of leaving some combination
of facts uncovered. In other words, overlapping of jurisdictions does
give the comfortable feeling that it is almost impossible for any situation
to slip between the edges.
A criticism frequently made of results produced by the choice of
situs of injury as the determinant of coverage in the Longshoremen's
Act is that workmen walk in and out of the act dozens of times a daywhenever they cross a gangplank. If full concurrent state coverage is
accepted, this criticism cannot be made of the state acts. The worker
will not walk out of the state act as he crosses the gangplank to the ship,
and, since some of the major maritime states have more attractive
benefits than those of the Longshoremen's Act, this should conduce to
tranquility of mind on the part of longshoremen and harbor workers.
Finally, as for the appeal to history, supporters of concurrent state
coverage could go back one phase earlier and suggest that the real
121. For a nominal additional premium, the employer can obtain a "Longshoremen's
Endorsement" on his insurance. In state-fund jurisdictions, an estimate can be made of
the relative amount of time spent on land and on water, and contributions adjusted accordingly. Puget Sound Bridge & Dredging Co. v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 185 Wash. 349,

54 P.2d 1008 (1936).
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source of all the trouble was the artificiality of the Jensen doctrine
itself. If amphibious workers had simply remained under their respective state acts, just like their neighbors who work exclusively on shore,
no one would have dreamed of suggesting that the result would be unfair to employer or employee, or inconsistent with the spirit and objectives of compensation legislation. If, then, approximately the same
result comes about as a consequence of the Davis, Moores, Baskin and
Calbeck cases, while it may occasion concern to constitutional law
purists, there is no cause for consternation in compensation circles.

